Research

Academic Work

“District Magnitude and Women’s Representation: Evidence from Argentina and Latin America”

It is widely accepted that gender quotas with closed-lists PR improve the election of women, especially in high district magnitudes. However, the net effect of magnitude has been unclear, as adding seats may increase fragmentation, which might therefore end up favoring the election of more men. Making use of natural quasi-experiments in Argentina as well as observational data from all of Latin America, the piece shows that increasing magnitude favors the representation of women only if fragmentation is avoided, as party magnitud mediates the main effects.

American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming. With Adrian Lucardi.

What is the value of a legislative position in an environment where ambition is progressive? Through the creation of a large dataset on political careers and electoral results, we demonstrate that a seat is not a sprongboard to executive position, but definitely a window to enter and remain in the big political game.

Political Science Research and Methods, 2020. With Adrian Lucardi.

Do workers represent workers in Congress? What happens to their group’s representation when the defense of their insterests is claimed by a populist party with labor ties, but also other parties include union members in their delegations? Using a database of legislators’ background and performing text analysis over more than 100,000 bills, the piece shows that workers are represented by subjects with labor ties in Argentina, regardless of partisanship. Relatedly, members of the alleged party of the workers do not care at all about the group unless they have explicit memebrship to the unions.

Latin American Politics and Society, 2018

How do legislators increase individual visibility in cases where resources are scarce and parties dominate most activities? We analyze a legislative activity that has been understudied in presidential designs, parliamentary questions, and show that they are strategically utilized by marginal legislators to improve their prospective chances.

Journal of Legislative Studies, 2018. With Eduardo Aleman and Margarita Ramirez.

We combine roll call votes, elite surveys, and public opinion data to disentangle the main determinants of floor votes in the Argentine Congress. In line with the literature, we find that party pressures explain most of the decisions, leaving a narrow margin of influence of ideology and the preferences of local district’s voters.

Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2018. With Eduardo Aleman, Pablo Pinto and Sebastian Saiegh.

The electoral calendar is a likely source of variation to test many aspects of political dynamics. This work shows that the particular renewal sequence of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (half of the members every two years) affects the kinds of politicians who run and are elected. Evidence demonstrates that more experienced politicians tend to run during concurrent elections with the presidency, while also show more bill productivity than their peers.

Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2018. With Adrian Lucardi

We evaluate Guillermo O’Donnell’s argument about an *impossible game* in Argentina and, after analyzing roll call votes of the era, find a different explanation for the same conclusion. Rather than the impossibility of reaching an equilibrium, the chronic instability was the product of the multiplicity of possible solutions to the game. Thus, actors chose to adopt positions that could be overturned by alternative coalitions across time, thereby making democracy not a stable outcome.

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2016. With Sebastian Saiegh

While the literature used network analyses to analyse cosponsorship behavior, no study had linked legislators’ decisions to cooperate in drafting bills as a function of political ambition. This piece shows that legislators who expect to become governors in the next run decide to tie their hands and cosponsor more together, regardless of their partisanship. In parallel, those deputies who expect righ the same spot immediately tend to ignore each other, rather than systematically not cooperate.

Comparative Political Studies, 2014

Argentina has one of the highest flows of bill introduction worldwide, too big to think it is a random process. This piece links the drafting of bills with multilevel political ambition. Through the creation of a large database of bills and a map of careers, the piece show that legislators expecting to become municipal mayors tend to inflate the volume of locally targeted bills drafted during their tenure.

Journal of Legislative Studies, 2014.

The Uruguayan system is well-known for being party-centered and for legislators’ reelection-seeking behavior. This paper looks at the growing progressive ambition that became the norm after 2000, where an increasing number of legislators attempted to jump to their local governorships (intendencias) from their seats. We find evidence that progressively ambitious deputies tend to draft more bills with local content then their peers, especially those from small and rural districts.

Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2014. With Daniel Chasquetti

Should changes in the method of selecting representatives affect their behavior?? The replacement of state-level nomination by popular election of Argentine Senators in 2001 made observers expect a performance more responsive to provincial voters. This piece shows that, in fact, legislators that were voted increased their congressional workload, systematically drafting more bills and dedicating more projects to target their state-level constituents.

Journal of Politics, 2013
“Progressive Ambition in a Static World: Climbing Up in the Chilean Congress – 1990-2018.”

Chile is a country where reelection rates in the Chamber of Deputies ranked at the top of most presidential regimes. However, patterns of progress can be recognized in the attempts to jump to the Senate. Do these individuals who try to become senators change the scope of their legislative activities, trying to reach a broader electorate? We analyze parliamentary speeches delivered to the floor during the 28 years of the binomial system. Preliminary findings suggest that progressive ambition is, in fact, a central factor affecting the delivery of targeted ‘oficios’ to the related senatorial constituency.

With Eduardo Aleman
“Genuflection, Group Representation, or Both? Unfolding Congressional Behavior in an Authoritarian Legislature: The Case of the Hegemonic (yet Group-Based) PRI”

While conventional views of the former dominant Mexican PRI highlight its top-down structure, a closer reading shows that it was based on the support of different groupd with strong prerogatives. Peasants (CNC), labor unions (CTM), middle-class organizations (CNOP) and even governors had the right of nominating legislative candidates, a fact that suggests a classic competing principals dilemma. Through a recognition effort of of the group origins of each deputy (not previously compiled) and the creation of a database of bills and amendments drafted, the piece seeks to assess if there were patterns of targeted representation coexisting with the strict party discipline in the partially democratic Mexico.

“Political Regimes and Politicians’ Behavior: Evidence from Mexican Legislators.”

Are politicians elected in free and fair elections necessarily more responsive to voters than those who serve in non-fully democratic environments? We make use of the particular transition to democracy en Mexico, where clean elections progressively started at the state level, and the number of legislators who occupied a seat before and after the democratization is considerable. We evaluate patterns of bill sponsorship, cosponsorship and other indicators of performance to infer (expected) variation in behavior

With Adrian Lucardi and Jeffrey Weldon
“Resignation as Promotion? Assessing Patterns of Early Departure in the Argentine Congress, 1983-2017”

Why do certain legislators leave office earlier? Is this a product of weakness, health, madness, or simply a matter of better opportunities? We study the determinants of resignation in almost 25 years in the Argentine Congress, a body embedded in a political system characterized by patterns of progressive ambition. We expect to verify whether early voluntary exit is related to experience, quality, political alignment or just career goals.

With Adrian Lucardi and Natan Skigin
“What do you see when you see me? An Experiment Gender, Candidates’ Names, and Support for Women’s Issues in Argentina.”

While it is a fact that women have won considerable space in political activities throughout the last decades, there is still uncertainty about their behavior in office, and also about who feels substantively represented by different knids of female officers. We center our analysis in how different features of women’s names (use of maiden or married names, nicknames, older or younger names, names belonging to a dynasty) affect voters’ perceptions about the candidates and their proposals. Through a conjoint experiment, we expect to find variation in the reactions of dissimilar targets of citizens over women’s rights proposals made by different combinations of names.

With Adrian Lucardi
“Does Money call Money? Unfolding Political, Economic and Social Elites in Argentina.”

Through the use of an original dataset of elites at the political, social and private sector levels, we test traditional theories of political sociology and analyze if a position of leadership in one area increases the chances of succeeding in the other ones. Alongside, we evaluate how sensitive the leadership in each sector is to political and economic shocks.

With Sebastián Saiegh and Adrián Lucardi
“Twins, Sisters, or just Acquaintance? Evaluating Legislative Behavior in the Resembling Colombian and Uruguayan Senates.”

In their their constitutional reforms of 1934 and 1991, respectively, Uruguay and Colombia released the election of their Senators at large, in a single national district. However, while Colombian senators sought votes in local constituencies and developed weak ties with party leaders; their Uruguayan colleagues have been a typical example of cohesion and coordination, following party mandates at the national level. What’s the impact of these similarities and differences over Senator’s legislative behavior? We attempt to answer our inquiries using data on bill drafting and career performance.

With Daniel Chasquetti and Felipe Botero.
“Does the Early Bird always Get the Warm? How First-round Victories Affect the Chance of Winning the Second Round in Runoff Systems.”

Does winning the first round increase the probability of winning the second round in runoff systems? Is there a threshold or a gap after which plurality winners should feel safe for winning the next round? In this paper we investigate these questions with data from national elections since 1948, as well as subnational elections from Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.

With Adrian Lucardi and Agustin Vallejo
“District Magnitude and Women’s Representation: Evidence from Argentina and Latin America”

It is widely accepted that gender quotas with closed-lists PR improve the election of women, especially in high district magnitudes. However, the net effect of magnitude has been unclear, as adding seats may increase fragmentation, which might therefore end up favoring the election of more men. Making use of natural quasi-experiments in Argentina as well as observational data from all of Latin America, the piece shows that increasing magnitude favors the representation of women only if fragmentation is avoided, as party magnitud mediates the main effects.

American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming. With Adrian Lucardi.

What is the value of a legislative position in an environment where ambition is progressive? Through the creation of a large dataset on political careers and electoral results, we demonstrate that a seat is not a sprongboard to executive position, but definitely a window to enter and remain in the big political game.

Political Science Research and Methods, 2020. With Adrian Lucardi.

Do workers represent workers in Congress? What happens to their group’s representation when the defense of their insterests is claimed by a populist party with labor ties, but also other parties include union members in their delegations? Using a database of legislators’ background and performing text analysis over more than 100,000 bills, the piece shows that workers are represented by subjects with labor ties in Argentina, regardless of partisanship. Relatedly, members of the alleged party of the workers do not care at all about the group unless they have explicit memebrship to the unions.

Latin American Politics and Society, 2018

How do legislators increase individual visibility in cases where resources are scarce and parties dominate most activities? We analyze a legislative activity that has been understudied in presidential designs, parliamentary questions, and show that they are strategically utilized by marginal legislators to improve their prospective chances.

Journal of Legislative Studies, 2018. With Eduardo Aleman and Margarita Ramirez.

We combine roll call votes, elite surveys, and public opinion data to disentangle the main determinants of floor votes in the Argentine Congress. In line with the literature, we find that party pressures explain most of the decisions, leaving a narrow margin of influence of ideology and the preferences of local district’s voters.

Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2018. With Eduardo Aleman, Pablo Pinto and Sebastian Saiegh.

The electoral calendar is a likely source of variation to test many aspects of political dynamics. This work shows that the particular renewal sequence of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (half of the members every two years) affects the kinds of politicians who run and are elected. Evidence demonstrates that more experienced politicians tend to run during concurrent elections with the presidency, while also show more bill productivity than their peers.

Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2018. With Adrian Lucardi

We evaluate Guillermo O’Donnell’s argument about an *impossible game* in Argentina and, after analyzing roll call votes of the era, find a different explanation for the same conclusion. Rather than the impossibility of reaching an equilibrium, the chronic instability was the product of the multiplicity of possible solutions to the game. Thus, actors chose to adopt positions that could be overturned by alternative coalitions across time, thereby making democracy not a stable outcome.

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2016. With Sebastian Saiegh

While the literature used network analyses to analyse cosponsorship behavior, no study had linked legislators’ decisions to cooperate in drafting bills as a function of political ambition. This piece shows that legislators who expect to become governors in the next run decide to tie their hands and cosponsor more together, regardless of their partisanship. In parallel, those deputies who expect righ the same spot immediately tend to ignore each other, rather than systematically not cooperate.

Comparative Political Studies, 2014

Argentina has one of the highest flows of bill introduction worldwide, too big to think it is a random process. This piece links the drafting of bills with multilevel political ambition. Through the creation of a large database of bills and a map of careers, the piece show that legislators expecting to become municipal mayors tend to inflate the volume of locally targeted bills drafted during their tenure.

Journal of Legislative Studies, 2014.

The Uruguayan system is well-known for being party-centered and for legislators’ reelection-seeking behavior. This paper looks at the growing progressive ambition that became the norm after 2000, where an increasing number of legislators attempted to jump to their local governorships (intendencias) from their seats. We find evidence that progressively ambitious deputies tend to draft more bills with local content then their peers, especially those from small and rural districts.

Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2014. With Daniel Chasquetti

Should changes in the method of selecting representatives affect their behavior?? The replacement of state-level nomination by popular election of Argentine Senators in 2001 made observers expect a performance more responsive to provincial voters. This piece shows that, in fact, legislators that were voted increased their congressional workload, systematically drafting more bills and dedicating more projects to target their state-level constituents.

Journal of Politics, 2013
“Progressive Ambition in a Static World: Climbing Up in the Chilean Congress – 1990-2018.”

Chile is a country where reelection rates in the Chamber of Deputies ranked at the top of most presidential regimes. However, patterns of progress can be recognized in the attempts to jump to the Senate. Do these individuals who try to become senators change the scope of their legislative activities, trying to reach a broader electorate? We analyze parliamentary speeches delivered to the floor during the 28 years of the binomial system. Preliminary findings suggest that progressive ambition is, in fact, a central factor affecting the delivery of targeted ‘oficios’ to the related senatorial constituency.

With Eduardo Aleman
“Genuflection, Group Representation, or Both? Unfolding Congressional Behavior in an Authoritarian Legislature: The Case of the Hegemonic (yet Group-Based) PRI”

While conventional views of the former dominant Mexican PRI highlight its top-down structure, a closer reading shows that it was based on the support of different groupd with strong prerogatives. Peasants (CNC), labor unions (CTM), middle-class organizations (CNOP) and even governors had the right of nominating legislative candidates, a fact that suggests a classic competing principals dilemma. Through a recognition effort of of the group origins of each deputy (not previously compiled) and the creation of a database of bills and amendments drafted, the piece seeks to assess if there were patterns of targeted representation coexisting with the strict party discipline in the partially democratic Mexico.

“Political Regimes and Politicians’ Behavior: Evidence from Mexican Legislators.”

Are politicians elected in free and fair elections necessarily more responsive to voters than those who serve in non-fully democratic environments? We make use of the particular transition to democracy en Mexico, where clean elections progressively started at the state level, and the number of legislators who occupied a seat before and after the democratization is considerable. We evaluate patterns of bill sponsorship, cosponsorship and other indicators of performance to infer (expected) variation in behavior

With Adrian Lucardi and Jeffrey Weldon
“Resignation as Promotion? Assessing Patterns of Early Departure in the Argentine Congress, 1983-2017”

Why do certain legislators leave office earlier? Is this a product of weakness, health, madness, or simply a matter of better opportunities? We study the determinants of resignation in almost 25 years in the Argentine Congress, a body embedded in a political system characterized by patterns of progressive ambition. We expect to verify whether early voluntary exit is related to experience, quality, political alignment or just career goals.

With Adrian Lucardi and Natan Skigin
“What do you see when you see me? An Experiment Gender, Candidates’ Names, and Support for Women’s Issues in Argentina.”

While it is a fact that women have won considerable space in political activities throughout the last decades, there is still uncertainty about their behavior in office, and also about who feels substantively represented by different knids of female officers. We center our analysis in how different features of women’s names (use of maiden or married names, nicknames, older or younger names, names belonging to a dynasty) affect voters’ perceptions about the candidates and their proposals. Through a conjoint experiment, we expect to find variation in the reactions of dissimilar targets of citizens over women’s rights proposals made by different combinations of names.

With Adrian Lucardi
“Does Money call Money? Unfolding Political, Economic and Social Elites in Argentina.”

Through the use of an original dataset of elites at the political, social and private sector levels, we test traditional theories of political sociology and analyze if a position of leadership in one area increases the chances of succeeding in the other ones. Alongside, we evaluate how sensitive the leadership in each sector is to political and economic shocks.

With Sebastián Saiegh and Adrián Lucardi
“Twins, Sisters, or just Acquaintance? Evaluating Legislative Behavior in the Resembling Colombian and Uruguayan Senates.”

In their their constitutional reforms of 1934 and 1991, respectively, Uruguay and Colombia released the election of their Senators at large, in a single national district. However, while Colombian senators sought votes in local constituencies and developed weak ties with party leaders; their Uruguayan colleagues have been a typical example of cohesion and coordination, following party mandates at the national level. What’s the impact of these similarities and differences over Senator’s legislative behavior? We attempt to answer our inquiries using data on bill drafting and career performance.

With Daniel Chasquetti and Felipe Botero.
“Does the Early Bird always Get the Warm? How First-round Victories Affect the Chance of Winning the Second Round in Runoff Systems.”

Does winning the first round increase the probability of winning the second round in runoff systems? Is there a threshold or a gap after which plurality winners should feel safe for winning the next round? In this paper we investigate these questions with data from national elections since 1948, as well as subnational elections from Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.

With Adrian Lucardi and Agustin Vallejo
© JUAN PABLO MICOZZI