Alliance for Progress? Multilevel Ambition and Patterns of Cosponsorship in the Argentine House

Juan Pablo Micozzi

*Comparative Political Studies* published online 18 June 2013
DOI: 10.1177/0010414013488564

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://cps.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/06/18/0010414013488564

Published by:

[SAGE](http://www.sagepublications.com)

Additional services and information for *Comparative Political Studies* can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://cps.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: [http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav](http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav)

Permissions: [http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav](http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav)

>> OnlineFirst Version of Record - Jun 18, 2013

What is This?
Alliance for Progress? Multilevel Ambition and Patterns of Cosponsorship in the Argentine House

Juan Pablo Micozzi

Abstract
How does political ambition affect strategies of cooperation in Congress? What activities do legislators develop with their peers to maximize their career goals? One of the main collaborative activities in a legislature, cosponsorship, has been widely analyzed in the literature as a position taking device. However, most findings have been restricted to environments where ambition is static (i.e., legislators pursuing permanent reelection), which restricts de facto the variety of causes and implications of legislative cooperation. I analyze patterns of cosponsorship as a function of ambition in a multilevel setting where legislators praise subnational executive positions more than a seat in the House. Through the analysis of about 48,000 bills introduced in the Argentine Congress between 1983 and 2007 and the development of a map of political careers, I follow a social networks approach to unfold different patterns of legislative cooperation. Findings show that patterns of cooperation among prospective gubernatorial candidates are strongly positive, while similar effects are not observed at the municipal level.

Keywords
cosponsorship, ambition, Argentina, cooperation, progressive, subnational

1Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Distrito Federal, Mexico

Corresponding Author:
Juan Pablo Micozzi, Department of Political Science, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Río Hondo # 1, Colonia Tizapán San Ángel, Delegacion Álvaro Obregón, México, Distrito Federal.
Email: juan@jpmicozzi.net
The theory of biological evolution is based on the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest. Yet cooperation is common between members of the same species and even between members of different species.

Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, p. 88

**Introduction**

What do politicians take into account at the moment of forging political cooperation in environments without a superior authority? Why do individuals with varying interests, ideas, and goals tend to engage in collective activities with specific colleagues? Shelves of literature in political science, economics, and other disciplines have explored the roots of voluntary cooperation, and how useful it can be to achieve individual and collective aims that involve dissimilar costs, requirements, and chances of success. Multiple studies have also dealt with the conditions under which subjects voluntarily agree to collaborate in collective activities, paying special attention to individual gains and benefits, along with the expected social outcome (Axelrod, 1984). More recently, studies started to recognize that collaboration can also be utilized as a signaling device to multiple actors. In this line, cooperation is not only an interesting fact for its effects but also for its impact as an intrinsic position taking. Based on the aforementioned assertions, questions of the motivations of politicians to cooperate in dissimilar environments and under varying constraints has garnered a considerable space in the contemporary discipline.

Given their heterogeneous and pluralistic nature, legislatures have become a frequent target for analyses of collective activities in political science. In trying to analyze the dissimilar sources and implications of varying types of congressional behavior, scholars have relied on multiple indicators. Among these, voting records have been used as commonplace devices. Roll call votes were utilized to gauge concepts such as degrees of cohesion and discipline (Carey, 2009; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2001; Morgenstern, 2004), responsiveness to party leaders (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2005; Jones, 1997; Jones & Hwang, 2005), patterns of party switching (Nokken, 2000; Nokken & Poole, 2004), government/opposition dynamics (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007; Jones, Hwang, & Micozzi, 2009; Rosenthal & Voeten, 2004), and even the feasibility of stable democratic equilibria (Micozzi & Saiegh, 2013). Notwithstanding, approaches focused on the so-called non–roll call position
taking devices have recently increased their salience in the literature. Activities like speeches inside and outside Congress (Highton & Rocca, 2005; Hill & Hurley, 2002; Proksch & Slapin, 2010), responses to newsletters (Butler, Karpowitz, & Pope, 2012), bill drafting (Crisp, Escobar-Lemmon, Jones, Jones, & Taylor-Robinson, 2004; Gamm & Kousser, 2010; Rocca & Gordon, 2010), and trips to home districts (Crisp & Desposato, 2004) can be counted among the most widely used instruments. Frequently, these public position taking devices have been recognized as mechanisms to target voters, but also interest groups, party leaders, expected presidential candidates, and even racial or ethnic clusters. Nevertheless, a particular signaling tool has won salience in contemporary analyses: patterns of cosponsorship. Based on its recognition as an instrument for individual and collective benefits, and backed by recent technical developments; scholars have increasingly studied the causes and consequences of cooperation in the process of drafting bills. Acknowledging the importance of this device, researchers have scrutinized how structural, contextual, and strategic motivations made specific subgroups more likely to coordinate efforts and cooperate. However, it is noteworthy how a fundamental explanatory factor of most kinds of political activities has either been ignored in these studies, or restricted to a by-default conventional direction: political ambition, also known as the heart of politics (Schlesinger, 1966).

Multiple pieces in the literature have highlighted how career aims affect many testable patterns of political performance. In fact, countless contributions, mostly inspired by the American experience, have relied on the well-known Mayhewian axiom that reveals constituency-oriented behavior as a strategy to pursue permanent reelection (Brady, Cogan, Gaines, & Rivers, 1996; Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002; Mayhew, 1974). Other scholarly work has analyzed how different patterns of ambition tend to influence multiple legislative activities; recognizing that, in fact, legislators at the national and subnational level may have other higher order career goals across countries and time, and tend to adapt their congressional behavior to these aims (Maestas, Maisel, & Stone, 2005; Samuels, 2003; Squire, 1988; Taylor, 1992; Treul, 2009; Victor, 2011). The puzzle becomes interesting when strategies of legislative cooperation are analyzed in light of these manifold career goals. With whom should individuals with varying kinds of career aims develop and communicate connections? So far, only partial answers exist for this inquiry. On one hand, the literature has recognized the usefulness of cosponsorship as a signaling device, and studies have analyzed multiple predictors of collaboration as a function of the short-term reelection aim. On the other hand, contributions have assessed how patterns of multilevel ambition tend to affect dissimilar behavioral indicators. However, analyses relating progressive
career goals and patterns of cosponsorship are not frequent in the literature. In particular, there is still uncertainty about what kinds of connections and ties legislators with progressive career goals should try to create, to improve their prospective chances of success. In addition, we do not know whether individuals with similar objectives tend to cooperate more with each other, and/or rely on other subjects with a strong reputation in the offices they expect to pursue. Increased knowledge on the relationship between complex patterns of ambition and legislative cooperation looks like a fundamental contribution to the knowledge of congressional behavior in general, and on the determinants of individual behavior in activities that are not enforced by a superior authority.

This piece attempts to fill this gap by developing a comprehensive test of patterns of cosponsorship in a system with a particular kind of leading ambition: one where legislators favor subnational executive office over a seat in Congress. To do so, I analyze patterns of cosponsorship in the Argentine House in a 24-year period where about 48,000 bills have been coauthored. I use an increasingly common technique, a social network analysis, to evaluate what strategies of legislative cooperation have deputies with progressive ambition performed. Results show that legislators with gubernatorial ambition tend to cooperate more with each other, showing that they seem more oriented toward colleagues, local bosses, and elites rather than toward voters.

**Cosponsorship and Ambition**

Cooperation in legislative activities is not an unexplored topic in political science. Multiple contributions in the literature have demonstrated how relevant cosponsorship decisions can be for manifold political goals, and how several individual attributes and political circumstances predict joint legislative activities. As a “low cost position taking device” (Kessler & Krehbiel, 1996), cosponsorship reveals information that creates cues to constituents (Campbell, 1982; Koger, 2003; Sulkin, 2009), and also to other congressmen (Kessler & Krehbiel, 1996; Ragsdale & Cook, 1987), as ways of communicating preferences and responsiveness. In this view, cosponsorship can be understood as a clearly targeted message sent by visibly restricted coauthors. Similarly, while legislative cooperation flags positions over a specific issue (Balla & Nemacheck, 2000), it excludes the costs associated with other signals such as abstention, negative voting, or explicit declarations (Rocca & Gordon, 2010).

As largely documented, shirking on the floor might imply losses of benefits for individual congressmen such as committee chairmanships, material resources, and even support for reelection (Cox & McCubbins, 1993). For this reason, academics have increasingly considered cosponsorship as a useful
device to signal positions without necessarily harming superiors or peers. Even though there is no consensus about the genuine meaning of a no-cosponsorship decision (Desposato, Kearney, & Crisp, 2011), scholars have recognized that a signature in a bill is more than a doodle, and therefore represents a political resource to be used for multiple goals. Based on this notion of the usefulness of such a cooperative signal, authors have tried to unfold the multiple determinants of cosponsorship activities. In analyses of the U.S. Congress, scholars have demonstrated that factors like party membership (Garand & Burke, 2006; Koger, 2003), seniority (Campbell, 1982; Rocca & Sanchez, 2008), ethnicity (Bratton & Rouse, 2011; Rocca & Sanchez, 2008), gender (Swers, 2005), cohort and physical proximity of offices (Rogowski & Sinclair, 2012), committee membership (Gross, 2008), levels of education (Caldeira & Patterson, 1987), electoral safety (Fenno, 1978; Harward & Moffet, 2010), state and religion (Gross, 2008), and even dissimilarity ("weak ties"; Kirkland, 2011) tend to increase the propensity of cooperation at bill drafting. Among the most common causal mechanisms used to explain the effects of such factors, authors have relied on ethnic- and gender-based trust and social norms, development of expertise, reductions in information costs, creation of personal ties, and the emission of signals to other relevant actors. Further approaches have underlined several expected effects of legislative cosponsorship, such as increases in the likelihood of approval of a bill (Browne, 1985; Wilson & Young, 1997), the strength to create credible commitments and therefore achieve policy goals (Bernhard & Sulkin, 2009), and the ability to pass amendments on the floor (Fowler, 2006). Thus, far from being a random fact, multiple attributes and expectations explain ties among legislators in the mentioned political setting.

However, these empirical findings fit well in the world depicted by Mayhew, where institutions and career paths make it unlikely that these colleagues will have to compete against each other for their political survival. Extending the argument, these patterns of cosponsorship make sense in the context of a giant logroll (Shespele & Weingast, 1987) where collaboration can forge positive sums. However, as widely acknowledged, not every collective body worldwide follows a norm of reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984) that governs individual and collective behavior. Therefore, legislative collaboration may have distinctive features depending on variation in rules, interests, and norms.

Recent contributions have explored cosponsorship structures in dissimilar institutional and political contexts. Kirkland (2012) analyzes patterns of cosponsorship in five subnational legislatures in the United States, and contradicts several conventional notions of the literature. Making use of the existing variation in electoral rules in his sample (closed-list proportional
he demonstrates that legislators from multimember constituencies have incentives to collaborate and jointly enhance their reputations; a contribution that challenges previous findings that highlighted free-riding temptations (Snyder & Ueda, 2007). This piece enhances the role of what Kirkland (2011) calls “small networks”: factors beyond the partisan or demographic connections that are utilized by individuals who need to boost their political perspectives. Based on a different environment, Crisp, Kanthak, and Leijonhufvud (2004) show that patterns of joint bill drafting in the Chilean House are a function of electoral expectations; where individuals tend to cosign bills with locally popular legislators, regardless of their partisanship. Given ruling electoral institutions (binomial districts with open lists) that force candidates to distinguish from their party colleagues, and the bipolar party system where each coalition tends to get one seat, incumbents try to increase their reputation by drafting bills with whoever will help them revalidate their mandate. In this scenario, the best strategy is “to cosponsor bills with their toughest competitors” (p. 704), which implies that “reelection-seeking legislators are no more likely to cooperate with fellow coalition list members than with opposition list members, when doing so provides no difference in vote-purchasing power” (p. 708). In his analysis of the Chilean Senate, Alemán (2009) demonstrates that, unlike in Argentina and the United States (et al., 2009), cosponsorship does not divide government and opposition as clearly as roll call analysis; instead, ties derived out of legislative collaboration show a higher proximity of several conservative senators to the then-governing center–left coalition. Chile is compared with Argentina by Alemán and Calvo (2013), where they find substantive differences in the partisan, territorial, and legislative dimensions of both networks. More recently, Calvo and Leiras (2012) show that provincial common origin (a strong network) became the main predictor of joint bill drafting, as the flipside of the process of denationalization of the Argentine party system.

However, while Crisp, Kanthak et al.’s piece makes a subtle reference to ambition; none of the remaining works even contemplate career perspectives as a predictor of cosponsorship. In other words, variation in ambition is not considered a relevant factor to understand patterns of legislative collaboration. This omission is notorious, especially considering the relevance of ambition in legislative studies, and the abounding literature that shows behavioral change as a function of the pursuit of higher order positions. In fact, Van der Slik and Pernacciaro (1979) and Schiller (1995) show that U.S. representatives tend to submit more bills when they expect to jump in their careers. Treul (2009) finds that senators deviate more from their party mandates whenever they want to run for the presidency. Victor (2011) affirms that legislators with progressive ambition try to demonstrate their competence by
signaling their policy expertise; however, these incentives are mitigated when legislators campaign for higher office. Taylor (1992) describes how Costa Rican deputies develop early ties with the presidential candidates with highest chances of winning. Ames (2001) points out that deputies introduce more budgetary amendments biased to their home municipalities when they compete for municipal spots in Brazil. Micozzi (2009) demonstrates that legislators with mayoral ambition submit more local legislation than their other colleagues in Argentina. However, cosponsorship has been absent as an indicator of behavior in all these studies.

This unexplored relationship opens a space for new inquiries. With whom should legislators with progressive ambition collaborate? Would the specific immediate career target affect patterns of cooperation? If legislative collaboration is considered a useful signal, and ambitious politicians are understood as rational individuals, the consideration of cosponsorship as an asset for prospective career goals becomes an interesting matter. However, at this point, a major clarification needs to be done to the theoretical understanding of the concept progress. If, as suggested by Schlesinger (1966), career advancement implies an increase in the scope of the office (i.e., from county to state, or from state to the nation); ambitious legislators at lower levels would need to broaden the territorial targets of their activities (Hill & Hurley, 2002; Victor, 2011). Therefore, their prospective work should be centered on more square miles of their home state, of their state as a whole, or even of the whole country, which might imply higher propensities of writing bills with colleagues of their neighboring constituencies, their state, or every other legislator, respectively.3

However, other sets of political and institutional incentives could change the relative value of public spots, and concomitantly alter the expected behavior of legislators in office. In settings where politics involve multiple tiers, subnational executive positions may be more valuable than a seat in the Federal House or Senate (Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, & Tommasi, 2002; Langston, 2010; Samuels, 2003). Such distribution of institutional power reshapes interests, strategies, and prospective actions performed by ambitious politicians. For legislators interested in subnational executive positions, not only the size of the new constituency may change but also the prospective median target of their actions. On one hand, voters are likely to differ. On the other hand, rivals, internal contenders, and local party bosses will be part of a new environment that follows a zero-sum dynamic. All in all, the pursuit of a personalized public spot will require prospective and defensive actions that trace the path to the position of interest. Assuming (as shown) that cosponsorship matters, and that territorially targeted actions are going to pay off more in future campaigns; gubernatorial candidates would need to send signals to
voters at the state level as a whole; while mayoral candidates would have to appeal to a lower subset of their electorates. If it is also supposed that, following Kessler and Krehbiel (1996), cosponsorship can be oriented toward other relevant political actors; ambitious individuals may be willing to demonstrate networks with past or future powerful actors, and take position toward the forthcoming status quo. Thus, other prospective executives, or past rulers of these subnational units, may be useful partners to send signals to significant political figures. Along the same line, revealing strong allies might deter prospective contenders from competing or persuade party elites not to support a rival in the internal contest. All these theoretical speculations open new inquiries regarding the expected cosponsorship decisions of legislators with varying career goals. Specifically, the question of with whom should progressively ambitious congressmen cooperate in multilevel systems with progressive ambition requires a careful empirical examination.

**Theoretical Remarks and Hypotheses**

As repeatedly stated, specific patterns of ambition could foster particular courses of action for joint legislative activities in multilevel settings. However, several baseline notions also need consideration, because ambitious politicians do not behave in a vacuum. I share Kirkland’s (2011) and Alemán and Calvo’s (2013) expectations that, everything equal, legislators are likely to cooperate with members of their strong networks, and thus collaborate more with their territorial fellows, party comrades, and committee mates. As argued, while party ties may reflect ideological consistency, and committee-level links may signal expertise, state-level bounds can be understood as communication of care and responsiveness to constituents, beyond (and in spite of) political and partisan differences. Complementarily, this piece introduces an innovative predictor of cooperation, already highlighted in other studies of complex multilevel politics (Micozzi, 2009; Samuels, 2003), but absent in all previous pieces of legislative collaboration: the municipal level. Scholars have recognized the increased relative value of a mayoral position in federal designs or unitary yet decentralized countries, as units that concentrate substantive budgets, public works, employment opportunities, and grant considerable levels of visibility. In addition, common city provenance might be an indicator of trust, a previous acquaintance, or interest in similar topics. Extending this line, cosponsorship among neighboring legislators would provide several degrees of “street credibility” among these bounded citizens. On the whole, I expect, in line with previous findings, that legislators cosponsor more with their provincial fellows, with their municipal neighbors, with their party comrades, and with their committee partners.
Regarding the core role of ambition, several salient trends deserve to be analyzed. First, retrieving Kessler and Krehbiel’s (1996) assertions, congressmen could use cosponsorship to target constituents, but also party fellows, elites, and potential contenders. By signaling other political actors, legislators would not center their actions in demonstrating local responsiveness, but try rather to communicate a privileged position in the forthcoming status quo. The development of ties with prospective powerful actors is likely to enhance an individual’s reputation, deter other (general or internal) competitors from challenging her candidacy, persuade leaders to endorse her in the forthcoming race, or even communicate commitments with forthcoming big names of the political scenario. Following this reasoning, the median prospective gubernatorial candidate would benefit from cosponsoring with other aspirant to a state executive, given bilateral and (expected) symmetric contributions. The same reasoning is theoretically valid for mayoral candidates who want to solidify their prospective chances. Over the basis of these reasoning, I formulate two hypotheses that test a progressive cosponsorship strategy:

**Hypothesis 1.1:** Legislators with gubernatorial expectations tend to cosponsor more with other prospective governors.

**Hypothesis 1.2:** Legislators with mayoral expectations tend to cosponsor more with other prospective mayors.

However, it is theoretically (and empirically) possible that two subjects in the legislature have exactly the same executive spot as an immediate goal. In such a circumstance, the benefits of creating a positive sum between local comrades would create identification costs, and therefore reduce the likelihood of them both writing bills together. Plus, all the tensions associated with an internal or a general competition would endogenously diminish the willingness to share the work. In technical words, the benefits of cooperation would become diffuse and hard to measure. The indivisibility of the prize would not only reduce the chances of claiming credit but might also end up rewarding the next rival in a zero-sum game. Therefore, two legislators with exactly the same spot in mind should be less likely to engage in cosponsorship. This choice could be identified as a defensive (no-)cosponsorship strategy:

**Hypothesis 2.1:** Legislators who expect to become governors are less likely to cosponsor with other legislators of their provinces with the same immediate career expectations.
Hypothesis 2.2: Legislators who expect to become mayors are less likely to cosponsor with other legislators of their municipalities with the same immediate career expectations.

Finally, following Crisp, Kanthak et al.’s depiction, individuals with particular career expectations might try to pursue gains in local reputation collaborating with other qualified colleagues, understood as individuals with already high levels of salience and solid reputations. In this case, signals would be useful at the level of the voters (closeness with popular actors might create some kind of coattail) and also elites and contenders, likely receivers of the enunciated strength of a candidate associated with renowned peers. Given the already stated multilevel concerns, Crisp, Kanthak et al.’s use of legislators from the opposition with high chances of reelection in the same district does not seem to be the most reliable proxy of useful partners. Instead, ambitious legislators could enjoy the presence of former governors or municipal mayors in the legislature, and make use of their already high levels of knowledge in their districts. Even conceding that these previous executives might have left the executive position just because of their bad reputation, there is theoretical space to consider that shared work with them can offer reputational advantages. For such reasons, I also consider the anchored cosponsor strategy as the third type.

Hypothesis 3.1: Legislators who expect to become governors are more likely to cosponsor with former governors of their provinces.

Hypothesis 3.2: Legislators who expect to become mayors are more likely to cosponsor with former mayors of their municipalities.

Case Selection, Data, and Estimations

To verify the accuracy of these hypotheses, it is necessary to test them in the context of a system where ambition is not static, and subnational offices are targets of current legislators’ activities. In this piece, I analyze the legislative performance of deputies between 1983 and 2007 in Argentina, a well-recognized case where politics are played along multiple tiers (Spiller & Tommasi, 2007), and careers involve the interaction of municipal, provincial, and national arenas (Micozzi, 2009). Argentina is a federal country divided in 23 provinces (along with an autonomous capital district) and 2,191 municipalities, where subnational units are keystones of the political game. Relevant decisions such as candidate selection for most positions (De Luca, 2008; De Luca, Jones, & Tula, 2002), the execution of considerable shares of the national budget (Gervasoni, 2010; Remmer & Gelíneau, 2003), and the
construction of political machines (Gibson, 2005; Jones & Hwang, 2005) take place at the provincial level. These facts reinforce the influence of local politics over federal dynamics, which includes congressional activities (Jones & Hwang, 2005), anchored in the election of representatives in PR closed lists at the provincial level and the mentioned nomination powers of local leaders. Once in Congress, rather than the pursuit of permanent reelecton (less than 20%), representatives are more interested in obtaining subnational executive posts (Jones et al., 2002; Micozzi, 2009). It was argued that this choice has several implications for congressional performance, such as low degrees of policy specialization (Jones et al., 2002), the increase of symbolic bill drafting, and development of legislation oriented toward the districts of reference of the legislators (Micozzi, 2009). Even though no piece has asserted that the organization of Congress reflects a giant logroll to benefit individuals a la Shepsle and Weingast; there is a proxy that suggests that individuals may use legislative resources to invest in their prospective careers: Compared with other Congresses, Argentine deputies and senators tend to submit an enormous amount of bills. Between 1983 and 2007, more than 180,000 projects have been initiated in the House and the Senate. On the flipside, the literature demonstrates that roll call voting behavior (Jones, 1995, 2002; Jones et al., 2009) clearly divides government and opposition, and party discipline is high, as a product of institutional incentives (Mustapic, 2002), the internal rules (Alemán, 2006), and the enforcement of the majority party (Jones & Hwang, 2005). Therefore, there is not a big space for personalization and individualization on the floor. In this sense, it was already demonstrated (Micozzi, 2009) that bill drafting does play the role of a useful non–roll call position taking device, by letting deputies target their own provincial electorates. Theoretical intuition would suggest that cosponsorship could also be strategically utilized, as it provides opportunities for mutual gains among legislators without paying the costs of public deviations from the party line. Whether it has been used the prescribed way is still a matter of empirical verification.

Between 1983 and 2007, about 50,000 bills have been drafted by two or more authors in the Argentine House. This information can be divided into 12 legislative 2-year periods where the composition of the Chamber has been very diverse, not only in terms of predominance, party delegations, and fragmentation but also regarding who have occupied the seats. Given the aforementioned very low 20% reelection rate, cohorts of subjects with dissimilar backgrounds, roles, and career perspectives have occupied seats in Congress, a fact that lets hypotheses be tested in dissimilar contextual scenarios. To conduct the empirical analysis, I collected information on every single bill written in the mentioned period, based on official records published by the
Direccion de Informacion Parlamentaria,6 which includes data about sponsors and cosponsors, their province and party, year of submission, and committees of treatment, among others. One of the biggest challenges in the data-generation process was the identification of the districts of reference of legislators, a necessary component to evaluate provincial and municipal pertinence as a predictor of cosponsorship. As it can be expected, the assessment of provincial origin was automatic (it is the unit for seats allocation), but the recognition of home municipalities7 was a hard endeavor, given the absence of a territorial link between the legislative election and local districts. In a similar fashion, it was not known what deputy was a former subnational executive or tried to compete for mayor or governor. To fill this vacuum, I used a comprehensive database of every single governor and mayor of the 24 provinces and 2,191 municipalities of Argentina between 1983 and 2007 created for (Micozzi, 2009). In parallel, I built up a widespread map of candidacies to governorships and mayoral offices. However, only 25% of legislators have had a subnational executive link8 in the period. Thus, to unfold the municipal origin of the remaining three quarters, I relied on Directorio Legislativo, a publication that systematically keeps record of legislators’ backgrounds, and complemented it with interviews, journalistic articles, phone calls, and even Internet searches. This strategy let me identify the districts of a 97% of the legislators in the period.

I opted to utilize an increasingly conventional technique to estimate relational data, the Exponential Random Graph Models, for the empirical estimations. Rather than merely calculating ideal points for each subject respect to every single other, exponential random graph models (ERGM) computes the effects of multiple covariates over the probability of actors sharing some attribute or action, which is cosponsoring, in this case. In methodological terms, these models take account for local clustering among actors (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011; Handcock, Hunter, Butts, Goodreau, & Morris, 2008; Robins, Pattison, Kalish, & Lusher, 2007). The dependent variable of this piece is the observed ties (edges) between each dyad of legislators. For each of the pairs of members $i$ and $j$, the random variable $y_{ij}$ takes the value of 1 if there is a tie and 0 otherwise. The probability of observing a tie is

$$P(y_{ij}|X) = \exp \frac{[(\theta^T g(y_{ij}, X)]}{k(\theta)},$$

where $X$ is a matrix of attributes associated with the nodes or ties edges in the network, $g(y_{ij}, X)$ is a vector of network statistics, $\theta$ is a vector of coefficients, and $k(\theta)$ is a normalizing constant. Therefore, the interpretation of results must be done in terms of increases in the probability of individuals sharing a given attribute to draft a bill together.
I based the right-hand side specification of the models on eight constitutive covariates. The first three (same partisanship, province, and committee) are factors already associated with cosponsorship in the literature, while, as mentioned, the municipal-level factor is an innovation of the current piece that belongs to the group of *strong network* covariates expected to perform positively. The four remaining covariates belong to the family of political ambition, as discussed above: gubernatorial candidacy, mayoral candidacy, gubernatorial background, and mayoral background. A first baseline model is computed with the goal of evaluating the baseline trends of each covariate, including tests of Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2, and is reported in Table 1. Subsequently, I include dyadic interactions in the second model to test the sets of Hypotheses 2 to 3. Results are presented in Table 2.

**Results**

Estimations provide interest results for my hypotheses, ranging from expected support to unanticipated outcomes that trigger new inquiries. As mentioned above, results reported in Tables 1 and 2 need to be interpreted as increases in the probabilities of two subjects who share a given attribute drafting a bill together, where 1 is a 100% increase compared with the baseline. The first noteworthy outcomes lie at the level of the *strong network* components, in the first and second models. Considered separately from ambition, provincial and municipal origins are positive and robust predictors of cosponsorship in almost every single legislative period, showing increased probabilities of cosponsorship between 15% and 110% at the state, and between 42% and 145% at the municipal level. These findings go in the direction prescribed in the literature, but add evidence of smaller levels of cooperation, something totally innovative in these kinds of studies. Moreover, in both models, the likelihood of cooperation among local neighbors is higher than that among same state legislators, a discovery that triggers multiple related inquiries in the areas of subnational politics and federalism. In a similar vein, the performance of another *big network* component, partisanship, is also positive and significant in every single year of the sample, reinforcing the notion that ideology and identities tend to make legislators closer to each other. Regarding committee membership, results have an erratic performance across time that prevents any kind of generalization.

The analyses of ambition-related hypotheses provide substantive results. The estimates measuring the likelihood of prospective governors cosponsoring legislation reflect a positive and consistent pattern. Model 1 shows that the coefficient is significant in 9 of the 12 analyzed periods, where increases in the chances of legislative cooperation range from 7% to 38%, with an
Table 1. Baseline Model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edges</td>
<td>-4.99***</td>
<td>-3.52***</td>
<td>-2.25***</td>
<td>-0.87***</td>
<td>-1.80***</td>
<td>-2.62***</td>
<td>-2.10***</td>
<td>-0.49***</td>
<td>-0.87***</td>
<td>-1.66***</td>
<td>-0.90***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
<td>0.86***</td>
<td>0.71***</td>
<td>0.91***</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
<td>0.66***</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>1.30***</td>
<td>0.77***</td>
<td>1.04***</td>
<td>1.11***</td>
<td>-0.30*</td>
<td>1.17***</td>
<td>1.38***</td>
<td>1.45***</td>
<td>1.14***</td>
<td>1.33***</td>
<td>1.18***</td>
<td>1.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>1.89***</td>
<td>1.46***</td>
<td>1.21***</td>
<td>1.23***</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>1.51***</td>
<td>1.15***</td>
<td>1.34***</td>
<td>1.46***</td>
<td>1.21***</td>
<td>0.96***</td>
<td>1.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>1.45***</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.64***</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.30*</td>
<td>1.90***</td>
<td>1.44***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral candidate</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.06.</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous governor</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.24***</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous mayor</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
<td>-0.21***</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>-0.25***</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>-0.32***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubernatorial candidate</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edges</td>
<td>-4.90***</td>
<td>-3.70***</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>-2.83***</td>
<td>-2.63***</td>
<td>-3.19***</td>
<td>-3.61***</td>
<td>-2.21***</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.89*</td>
<td>-1.07*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>0.84***</td>
<td>1.15***</td>
<td>0.97***</td>
<td>1.10***</td>
<td>0.71***</td>
<td>0.77***</td>
<td>0.85***</td>
<td>0.65***</td>
<td>0.96***</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
<td>0.79***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>1.17***</td>
<td>0.42**</td>
<td>0.74***</td>
<td>0.88***</td>
<td>0.89***</td>
<td>1.27***</td>
<td>1.34***</td>
<td>1.04***</td>
<td>0.93***</td>
<td>0.98***</td>
<td>1.27***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>1.89***</td>
<td>1.47***</td>
<td>1.22***</td>
<td>1.23***</td>
<td>1.53***</td>
<td>1.17***</td>
<td>1.34***</td>
<td>1.48***</td>
<td>1.25***</td>
<td>0.97***</td>
<td>1.20***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>1.54***</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>*<em>-0.37</em></td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>1.92***</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>***0.13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral candidate</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.86***</td>
<td>-0.47*</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.66***</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
<td>-0.65***</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.80***</td>
<td>-1.03***</td>
<td>-0.70***</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous governor</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.43*</td>
<td>-1.75***</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.84***</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
<td>0.78***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>1.22***</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.39**</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous mayor</td>
<td>0.64***</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.51***</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>-0.71***</td>
<td>-0.49***</td>
<td>-0.24***</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubernatorial candidate</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>-0.96***</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>0.62***</td>
<td>0.65***</td>
<td>1.00***</td>
<td>0.59***</td>
<td>1.08***</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.26*</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral candidate, same district</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubernatorial candidate, same province</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubernatorial candidate, previous governor</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>-0.01**</td>
<td>-0.01**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral candidate, previous mayor</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
average of 22%. When interactive effects are included in the second model, coefficients are even stronger, as shown in Table 2. Chances of cosponsorship between gubernatorial candidates increase up to a 108% in the 9th period analyzed, leaving an average of 60% for the nine periods where it performs with significance. This way, results bolster the enounced progressive strategy that tends to orientate actions more to leaders and contenders rather than to voters. However, municipal estimates show erratic results in terms of the direction of coefficients, and also statistical significance. Such a changing performance does not support the mentioned theoretical notions and leaves the question of whether such smaller scale party leaders would recognize (and take into account) whom the next strong actors at the municipal level in the whole country are likely to be. In contrast, progressive strategies do operate consistently at the gubernatorial level, where coalitions with expected future executives may be a credible signal of influence even for national politics.

The empirical evaluation of the defensive Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 shows that fear was more theoretically apparent than real. In fact, the gubernatorial and mayoral estimates reported in Table 2 show minimal effects (slightly different from zero) with changing signs, which suggests that potential contenders in a subnational executive race have ignored each other, rather than cooperating or preventing collaboration. A valid question is whether indifference is based on the knowledge of the decreasing returns of cooperation, or simply that the perception of expected harms is marginal and therefore does not even deserve care and attention. The rejection of both hypotheses, therefore, leaves new questions about the behavioral consequences of ambition in zero-sum games environments open.

Finally, the set of anchored hypotheses contradicts theoretical speculations. Contrary to expectations based on the mentioned reputational argument, prospective governors are less likely to cosponsor with past provincial executives (a 47% less on average in the seven periods with statistical significance). What explains the poor performance of a strong argument that fits so well in the neighboring Chilean case? Several alternative hypotheses could be formulated to patch this inaccurate reasoning: On one hand, it could be argued that, effectively, former governors’ reputation is so bad that sharing activities with them would have a net negative effect for prospective candidates. This interpretation would imply that former provincial executives are some sort of political corpses that are occupying a seat as a prelude to retirement. In other words, they would not really be qualified colleagues. On the other hand, it could be stated that former governors want, in fact, to return to the provincial executive spot, which would put them in open conflict with these new contenders. However, this supposition should be denied by the
indifferent results of Hypothesis 2.1. In any case, the relationship is negative and significant in most periods, showing compelling decreases that range between 25% and 76%. Conversely, mayoral candidates do not have stable and robust cooperative relationships with former municipal executives, based on the changing sign and significance of the interactive covariate. In sum, in light of all the results, progressive ambition does play a role over patterns of legislative cooperation, especially at the gubernatorial level. The relevance of the positive and negative findings of the empirical tests reinforces the notion that the heart of politics is also affecting collaboration decisions in congressional environments, in line with most other contributions in the field of legislative politics based on dissimilar indicators.

**Conclusion**

How does multilevel ambition affect patterns of cooperation in legislatures? This work attempted to verify whether a particular kind of collaboration in collective representative bodies, cosponsorship of legislation, was utilized by politicians interested in improving their careers in multilevel environments with progressive ambition. Results show that voluntary cooperation among interested individuals is frequently utilized to signal other relevant political actors and anticipate the forthcoming status quo, especially by those interested in the second most relevant position in Argentine politics: provincial governorships. Contrary to theoretical speculations, legislators do not care about potential conflicts of interests or identification problems even if they compete for the same spot. In this sense, strategic use of cosponsorship can be interpreted as a positive sum that is, concomitantly, absent of the implications of zero-sum dynamics. In this sense, the prospective benefits of legislative collusion among ambitious prospective governors perfectly fit in Kirkland’s understanding of weak ties or small networks as strategic attempts by legislators to alter their base level of support.

These realizations are particularly noteworthy when they are transposed with the already high likelihood of cosponsorship by individuals belonging to the same province and municipality. Legislators who live in the same municipality are even more likely to draft bills together than those with the same provincial origin. However, ambition is irrelevant for collaboration of subjects with similar career perspectives at the municipal level. One feasible interpretation is that the small, dense, and strong local network bolsters cooperation for the sake of street credibility, but hardly affects municipal-level actors’ perceptions toward the future. Such reasoning may make sense, as no single actor can take the forthcoming status quo of more than 2,000 municipalities into account. Thus, prospective mayors do not have incentives to
send signals at this level. In contrast, the strong network at the provincial level is reinforced with other signals whenever legislators are attempting to jump to the governorship. In those cases, ambitious congressmen tie their hands with other peers and signal leaders and contenders that they will be powerful in the next round of the game. In conclusion, ambition does make a difference for cosponsorship, and also cosponsorship is an asset for legislators with specific career goals.

Another interesting lesson of this piece is that, unlike the Mayhewian seminal model, legislative signals are more oriented to state-level elites and contenders rather than to voters. Nonetheless, nothing prevents bill drafting from having an indirect effect over the electorates, but they seem to be more centered at the elite level. In parallel, theoretical speculations based on the notion that past executives might be a solid source of support for ambitious subjects are discarded. The extension of Crisp, Kanthak et al’s argument does not fit well in an environment where national legislative positions may be used as the prelude to retirement. As observed, gubernatorial candidates try to hide away from these individuals.

Finally, results in this piece provide original evidence to the literature of subnational influences over federal politics, and particularly to conventional wisdom on legislative politics in Argentina. Multiple pieces (Jones, 1995, 1997, 2002; Jones et al., 2009; Jones & Hwang, 2005) have shown, with some doses of frustration, that the conventional technique to analyze legislative behavior, roll call analysis, does not provide a clue to the federal dimension, regardless of most theoretical prescriptions. Other contributions (Micozzi, 2009) have shown that this hidden component can be recognized at the level of bill drafting. This piece adds another brick to this wall in construction: Now, we know that cosponsorship also reflects provincial and municipal-level political dynamics in the Argentine Congress.

Acknowledgments

I am thankful to Ernesto Calvo, Brian Crisp, Scott Desposato, Colin Hannigan, Yann Kerevel, Marina Lacalle, German Lodola, Jillian Medeiros, Scott Morgenstern, Michael Perez, Michael Rocca, Sebastian Saiegh and Gilles Serra for comments and suggestions.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Notes

1. The quoted piece does an excellent job in capturing the varying reasons argued to explain a non-cosponsorship decision. As correctly mentioned by an anonymous reviewer, it is not generally clear why, if it is such a cheap and useful resource, almost every legislator does not try to be a cosponsor of almost every bill. I rely on two arguments to explain a more restricted participation. On one hand, time is scarce (Cox, 2006), and the cost of obtaining information about every bill planned to be submitted is not likely to be the very best investment. On the other hand, there is selection effects, based on the multiple factors described in the literature. I do not think that cosponsorship is everyone’s by-default option for each bill written. Rather, private information of small and denser networks let legislators build selective interactions with whom they will send the right messages to the right audience. I am very thankful to the anonymous reviewer for this important point.

2. Of course, it is feasible that two American legislators compete for a seat in the Senate or the state governorship. However, the well-documented high reelection rates and the value of congressional careerism make these possibilities not extremely frequent.

3. This is a personal theoretical speculation that will be tested in further projects.

4. I am indebted to Sebastian Saiegh and an anonymous reviewer for excellent suggestions and deep inquiries on the inclusion of the municipal level.

5. Multiple reasons can lead an executive’s decision of moving away from office. Thus, it cannot be assumed that their reputation is necessarily bad.

6. www.hcdn.gob.ar

7. The municipal origin of each deputy was determined by the place where she is registered to vote and compete for a municipal-level position.

8. I mean a background as a mayor or governor, or a candidacy for these positions.

References


**Author Biography**

**Juan Pablo Micozzi** is an assistant professor of political science at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). He specializes in comparative politics, focusing on the area of Latin America. His research interests include legislative studies, electoral rules, federalism, and quantitative methodology. His work has been published in *Journal of Politics, Journal of Legislative Studies, Journal of Politics in Latin America, Legislative Studies Quarterly*, and several edited volumes.